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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________ 
 
No. 11-3425 
_________ 
 
 
WILLIAM J. DONOHUE, 
                               Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JEFFREY RINEER;  
GEORGE CRONIN 
 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-10-cv-01324) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
 
_______ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 25, 2012 
 
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed: June 26, 2012 ) 
______ 
 
OPINION 
______ 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.  
 William Donohue was acquitted of murder and conspiracy charges in connection 
with the death of his mother, Bernadette Lieben.  Donohue later filed suit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that investigating officers Jeffrey Rineer and George Cronin 
maliciously prosecuted him in violation of the Fourth Amendment.1  The District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Rineer and Cronin, holding that (1) Donohue 
failed to show a lack of probable cause to initiate a criminal proceeding against him, and 
(2) Donohue introduced no evidence that Rineer and Cronin “acted maliciously or with 
an intent other than to bring the plaintiff to justice.”  App. at 23.  Donohue timely 
appealed.2
 Donohue argues that the District Court erred by concluding that there was 
probable cause to initiate his criminal proceedings.  However, as Appellees correctly 
highlight, we need not reach this issue because the District Court’s decision rests on an 
alternative ground.  “To prove malicious prosecution under Section 1983, a plaintiff must 
show that: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding 
ended in plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the 
defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; 
and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure 
  
                                              
1 Rineer and Cronin filed a criminal complaint against Donohue, charging him 
with first and third degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.  The officers 
applied to a magistrate for an arrest warrant and supported their application with an 
affidavit of probable cause.   
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
3 
 
as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 
(3d Cir. 2003).  Here, Donohue does not challenge the District Court’s holding that he 
failed to produce any evidence suggesting that Appellees acted maliciously, thus waiving 
the issue.3
                                              
3 Donohue incorrectly states in his opening brief that the District Court “focused 
exclusively on the probable cause element.”  Appellant’s Br. at 11.  However, the Court 
relied on elements three (probable cause) and four (malicious intent) as independent 
reasons to dismiss Donohue’s Section 1983 claim.  Donohue failed to file a reply brief 
with this court addressing the waiver issue. 
  See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well 
settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief 
constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 
659, 668 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n situations in which there is one or more alternative 
holdings on an issue, . . . failure to address one of the holdings results in a waiver of any 
claim of error with respect to the court’s decision on that issue.”), abrogated on other 
grounds by Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).  Because the 
lack of evidence showing malicious intent is an adequate and independent ground for the 
District Court’s judgment, we will affirm. 
